SPECIAL REPORT: INVESTIGATING FLIGHT 3407
Colgan never knew pilot failed three tests
Airline did not check the records
WASHINGTON — The airline that operated Continental Connection Flight 3407 never knew that the pilot, Capt. Marvin D. Renslow, had failed three federal flying tests before his hiring.
Moreover, the carrier, Colgan Air, never double-checked with federal officials to see whether Renslow’s application — which listed only one failed “check ride” — had revealed his complete test record.
A spokesman for the airline said that it is standard industry procedure not to do such verifications, which would require the approval of the applicant under the federal Privacy Act.
Renslow’s qualifications and actions are expected to take center stage today as the National Transportation Safety Board begins three days of hearings into the Feb. 12 crash of Flight 3407 in Clarence Center that claimed 50 lives.
On the eve of the hearings, sources close to the investigation said the sessions are likely to detail several other key facts, including:
• Renslow was chatting inappropriately with his co-pilot in violation of federal regulations moments before the plane crashed, sources told The Buffalo News.
•The co-pilot, Rebecca L. Shaw, was fatigued and ill after having flown a red-eye flight to Newark, N. J., where Flight 3407 originated, from her home in Seattle.
• Investigators are expected to sharply question whether Colgan provided the crew of Flight 3407 adequate training in flying in icing conditions and in stall recovery.
In a statement, Colgan on Monday acknowledged that Renslow had failed three general aviation check rides from the Federal Aviation Administration before his hiring in 2005.
Renslow disclosed only one of those failed check rides rides on his application, and Colgan learned of the others after the crash, the airline said.
Asked whether Colgan double-checked Renslow’s application statements on the check rides with the FAA, Colgan spokesman Joe Williams said the airline did not do so.
“Consistent with standard practice in the airline industry, Colgan did not attempt to access information on prior general aviation check ride failures by its applicants,” he said.
Because of restrictions imposed by the Privacy Act of 1974, the FAA would release those records only if the pilot agreed in writing to their release, said Laura Brown, an agency spokeswoman.
The FAA check ride, the last step a pilot must take before receiving his certification, consists of oral and flight-performance examinations.
Check rides are also required when a pilot switches to another airplane, and Renslow failed two of those check rides after joining Colgan. The last of those failures came 16 months before the crash, on the Saab 340 aircraft, Colgan said.
While pilots often fail those tests once or twice, “it is fairly uncommon to fail three,” said a source with knowledge of the safety board investigation of the crash. “That’s a little high. But then, why did they hire him?”
Colgan defended Renslow.
“Captain Renslow was fully qualified in the Q400,” the plane that crashed in Clarence Center, the Colgan statement said.
Renslow held the highest level of certification the FAA offers for the Q400 and had 126 hours of flight and ground training in the aircraft. Renslow also passed two check rides in the Q400, Colgan said.
Nevertheless, sources close to the safety board investigation said it is clear that Renslow did not perform well during Flight 3407. He was chatting inappropriately with his co-pilot after the plane descended below 10,000 feet, even though FAA “sterile cockpit” rules mandate no extraneous conversation or activity at that point.
“They were talking about things they should not have been talking about,” said a source close to the investigation.
Full details of that conversation are expected to be revealed this morning, when the safety board releases a transcript from the plane’s flight voice recorder.
Pilots cautioned, though, that sterile cockpit violations can range from one stray comment to entire distracting conversations.
The safety board is also expected to question whether the crew of Flight 3407 was fatigued. Renslow had worked overnight shifts in the weeks before moving to the evening shift he flew the night of the crash, sources told The News, but Colgan released his schedule from the days immediately before the crash and said he should have been well-rested.
“Captain Renslow had nearly 22 consecutive hours of time off before he reported for duty on the day of the accident,” Colgan said. “That was more than sufficient time for him to obtain adequate rest, and nearly three times the FAA-minimum required rest period.”
But Shaw had flown overnight from Seattle the night before the crash in order to be in Newark for her work shift that day and had complained of having a cold, according to sources close to the probe.
Colgan never mentioned that issue directly in its statement but said: “Every Colgan Air pilot has an absolute obligation as a professional to show up for work fit for duty.”
In addition to examining the pilot’s fitness, the hearings will turn a critical eye to Colgan’s training programs, sources said. The airline might not have adequately trained pilots in the intricacies of the airplane’s deicing system and its stall warning and speed controls, said sources close to the probe.
In particular, the crew might not have understood that by activating a switch on the plane’s controls, they had decreased the speed at which the plane’s stall-alert system would activate. For that reason, sources said, the stall warning came as a surprise to Renslow and Shaw.
Nevertheless, Colgan defended its training for pilots flying in icy conditions. Crew members assigned to the Q400 received training in the plane’s Ice Protection Systems both in classes and in simulation, the airline said.
In addition, the airline said that it required pilots to take a winter operations quiz, read and sign a memo reminding them how to obtain required flight speeds under icing conditions and read a bulletin regarding de-icing procedures at the Newark airport.
But the investigation of Colgan’s training is expected to extend beyond the issue of icing.
The safety board has said that after the plane’s “stick pusher” activated and automatically pushed the nose of the plane downward to gain speed, Renslow pulled back on the plane’s yoke, causing the twin-engine turboprop to jerk upward. Aviation experts said that this altered the air flow over the wings to the point where the plane spun out of control.
Sources noted that Colgan does not offer a simulator trainer in the operations of the stick pusher, a part of the stall-warning system, but Colgan down-played that issue.
“A stick pusher demonstration in an aircraft simulator is not required by the FAA and was not part of the training syllabus used in the training provided by the aircraft manufacturer through one of the world’s leading aviation training companies, and thus was not included in Colgan’s Q400 training program,” the airline said.
“All Colgan pilots, including Q400 pilots, are again taught how to recognize and recover from a stall during training and are tested on those procedures during check rides that occur before a pilot becomes rated to fly an aircraft.”
jzremski@buffnews.com and mbeebe@buffnews.com
Log into MyBuffalo to post a comment
MyBuffalo is the new social network from Buffalo.com. Your MyBuffalo account lets you comment on and rate stories at buffalonews.com. You can also head over to mybuffalo.com to share your blog posts, stories, photos, and videos with the community. Join now or learn more.
Reader comments