In 1902, Britain’s armed forces suffered the most crushing defeat the British Empire had ever known. In total, more than 60,000 military and civilian casualties were suffered on both sides in a brutal war in the African Transvaal region. Despite the numerous English troops that volunteered or were called back into service, as well as reinforcements brought in from Australia, Canada and New Zealand, at the end of three years the British Army admitted defeat and ceded control of the region to the White South Africans who would go on to establish apartheid rule.

England’s manpower was simply no match for these Boer farmers — who were better equipped, who knew the terrain better and who utilized insurgent tactics and guerrilla warfare to bring the British Army to its knees. A few short decades later, the British Empire would come to view this war, sometimes referred to as “Britain’s Vietnam,” as the beginning of the end of the British Empire.

But it’s strange how difficult it is to view history’s trajectory from inside the events themselves. It is only in retrospect that history takes on a shape and events connect together in a logical fashion, and one can begin to discern chains of causality.

Back in 1892, most British analysts did not see the stunning defeat in the Boer War as the beginning of anything, much less the downfall of the British Empire. Instead, they viewed it as a short-term setback, and hearings in Britain’s Parliament focused on the intelligence failures that led to Britain’s army being understaffed, unprepared and outgunned.

But few analysts were able, at that time, to see the big picture—either that Britain’s empire was overextended with too many commitments throughout the world or that national movements were beginning to arise that queried Britain’s role and interests in the region.

The question is whether this story of long-ago events is in any way relevant to recent events in the United States. I think it is. One can discern a similar pattern in the last months—in our own administration’s focus on correcting and identifying short-term solutions to an intelligence “crisis” rather than taking a long-term strategic audit of U. S. interests around the globe.

The question is whether it is in America’s interest to simply get better at identifying individuals and groups wishing to harm us in our airports, public spaces and embassies. In the short term, this may be sufficient to shore up our interests and prevent further harm to our citizens. However, if terrorist attacks are merely a symptom of a deeper disease — of troubling anti-American sentiments throughout the globe, a backlash against globalization and the rage of those who do not share our values or our vision of the future — then blaming intelligence failures and attempting to stem terrorist attacks is a futile approach.

Mary Manjikian, Ph. D., is a visiting lecturer at Regent University’s School of Government and a former U. S. Foreign Service officer.