Now that former Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah has dropped out of consideration for the Afghan presidency, essentially conceding victory to President Hamid Karzai, the United States has to find a way to work with someone currently considered to be a large part of the problem.

For Karzai’s part, he has to view the situation as his last best chance to make his mark and leave behind a legacy of success in stabilizing a turbulent Afghanistan.

Abdullah’s claim that he could not accept a runoff led by the same Karzai-appointed election commission that managed fraud-marred voting in August is well taken. Abdullah declared that a “transparent election is not possible.”

And with the lingering question of whether Abdullah would have made it first across the finish line, the Obama administration is left to figure out a war strategy, with a highly questionable ally. It will be hard for American troops to win the hearts and minds of Afghans while supporting a Kabul administration widely viewed as corrupt.

Karzai, who once enjoyed comparisons to Nelson Mandela and Bill Clinton in terms of his political skills, has responded reluctantly to American pressure. His pledge to combat corruption was made to his people as he stood between high-ranking Afghan officials seen by those people as part of the problem, and unlikely to contribute to the solution. And it doesn’t help that the president’s half-brother, Kandahar regional leader Ahmed Wali Karzai, has been rumored to be involved in the drug trade—as well as being, according to a New York Times article, on the CIA payroll.

So, how does the United States begin to work with someone who went from being celebrated to being considered just another bad character in Afghanistan’s struggles? Continued pressure is essential, along with strong reminders that if the United States does pull out of Afghanistan, its president could meet the same sorry fate as past Afghan leaders.

Zalmay M. Khalilzad, a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, also told the Council on Foreign Relations during a recent interview that Karzai should be given incentives to make the right decisions to build a competent, strong government that would draw Afghan respect, enhance the chances of regional stabilization and ease the American path to eventual disengagement.

Violence has escalated and last month was the deadliest for American forces since 2001. Until Kabul can assert the rule of law throughout Afghanistan and provide services to the Afghan people, that situation is not likely to improve.