Colgan Air says the probable cause of February's fatal crash in Clarence Center that

claimed 50 lives was the pilots' "loss of situational awareness and failure to follow Colgan

Air training and procedures, which led to a loss of control of the aircraft."

The regional airline company, in a 66-page report to the National Transportation Safety

Board, also cited as contributing to the crash the lack of low-speed warnings in the cockpit

instrument panel on the Bombardier Dash 8-Q400 turboprop.

But the Air Line Pilots Association, the union representing Colgan pilots, said in its 62-

page report to the safety board that pilot error did not cause the worst aviation crash in

Western New York.

Rather, the pilots union said, a combination of factors caused the crash. And it cited

Colgan for failing to adequately prepare the pilots for the conditions that faced them Feb.

12, when the aircraft went into an aerodynamic stall and spun out of control.

Colgan was in too much of a rush to start new service from Newark-Liberty Airport using the

new Q400s, the pilots union said, and failed to adequately train its pilots and provide them

the proper operating manuals for the sophisticated aircraft.

Colgan Air, for example, boiled down four pages of the Bombardier manual on flying in icing

conditions to a single paragraph in the hastily put together Colgan manual, the pilots union

said.

And despite Colgan's criticizing Bombardier for failing to include cockpit low-speed

warnings in the Q400s, the airline in January doubled its fleet of Q400s from the Canadian

manufacturer by ordering another 15 of the turboprops at a cost of $422 million.

The two reports were submitted without fanfare to the safety board Dec. 7, as the board

continues to investigate the cause of the turboprop crash.

What's at stake

At stake is not only the safety of the flying public in preventing future crashes, but also

the liability Colgan faces from the more than two dozen lawsuits filed so far after the

Clarence crash.

Colgan does not admit any shortcomings in its report, signed by Mike Crook, director of

safety for Colgan Air.

"Colgan Air has a robust safety culture," Crook wrote. "The company has operated since 1991

and has flown over 10 million passengers. Prior to this tragic accident, Colgan Air never had

a single passenger fatality."

But the pilots union disputes that safety comes first at Colgan.

"Colgan management consistently stated that "Safety Is Our No. 1 Priority,'" the union

reported, "but their actions demonstrated that reliability and on-time performance were the

true drivers."

The safety board has not yet completed its investigation, but from its hearings in May and

reconstruction of Flight 3407's final moments, it's clear that Capt. Marvin D. Renslow and

First Officer Rebecca Lynn Shaw failed to take the proper steps that would have allowed a safe

landing.

Had they done so, Colgan said, based on simulator tests done after the accident, they would

have come out of an aerodynamic stall and landed safely.

Colgan said one of the contributing factors of the crash was the cockpit chatter between

Renslow and Shaw, in violation of both Federal Aviation Administration and Colgan rules as the

two began their descent into Buffalo.

The pilots lost situational awareness, Colgan said, and the speed of the turboprop dropped

to the point that a stick shaker alarm activated, meaning the aircraft was approaching an

aerodynamic stall.

Differing views Colgan said Renslow had been trained in such

situations to lower the nose of the aircraft and increase speed.

"Rather than release back pressure and add power, as he was trained to do," Colgan Air

reported, "the captain pulled back on the yoke."

"Contrary to his Colgan Air training," the airline added, "the captain did not add full

power after the onset of the stick shaker. Instead, the captain waited three seconds after the

onset of the stick shaker before increasing the power to only 75 percent torque."

Because of that, the stall continued to the point that the stick pusher activated. This

automatically does what Renslow should have done, pushing down on the yoke to lower the nose.

But the pilot did not allow the plane to pull itself out with the stick pusher, Colgan

said.

"The captain again pulled back on the yoke," the airline said.

The plane went into its fatal spin and crashed.

The pilots union, however, said it's not that simple.

They cite a video about flying in icing conditions that Colgan showed all its pilots during

training, one that was done by NASA.

In that video, pilots are shown the proper procedure for coming out of a tailplane stall,

not a wing stall as the Colgan plane is believed to have experienced.

And the proper procedure for that, the pilots union said, is exactly what Renslow did. Pull

back on the yoke. And it's also the correct procedure for what Shaw did, by lowering the

flaps.

"The crew actions in attempting to recover from the stall were very similar to those of a

tailplane stall recovery," the pilots union wrote. "It appears that the crew of Flight 3407

did not recognize the condition they were in."

The pilots union said that stick pusher training should be part of the airline's

curriculum, so that when the stick pusher activates, pilots know how to respond.

"The training provided by Colgan to this crew was deficient," the pilots union said. "The

Colgan training was incomplete, incorrect and did not provide this crew with the tools they

needed to appropriately manage this event."

Colgan disputed that.

"Stick pusher simulator demonstration training is not a standard procedure in the airline

industry," Colgan said. "Colgan Air's Saab 340 training, however, did include hands-on stick

pusher training. Renslow had two sessions."

Fatigue issue

The airline and pilots union also differ on a number of other issues that have come up in

the investigation.

On fatigue, Colgan said that Shaw should not have commuted from Washington State the night

before the flight and instead should have stayed in a Newark hotel.

"Commuter housing in Newark would have cost Shaw $250 a month, or 20 percent of her gross

salary," the pilots union said. "That coupled with the already alarmingly low salary gave her

few options but to live with her parents and complete a transcontinental commute."

The airline also said that Renslow commuted from Florida and did not get enough sleep.

"Colgan Air fatigue policy promotes safety," the airline said. "Colgan Air commuting

policy was not a factor in the accident."

The union disagreed.

"The organizational culture at Colgan was primarily punitive," the union said.

Colgan called for Bombardier to make changes in its cockpit warning systems, especially

speed settings when flying in icing conditions.

It also called on the FAA to establish a database for airlines to get real-time records of

its pilots — Renslow had failed to admit to two previous FAA test failures.

And Colgan said airlines, in order to monitor and improve pilot professionalism, should be

allowed to use confidential groups to analyze cockpit recordings.

The recordings are never examined except in the cases of crashes. The pilots union opposes

the measure.

The union listed 28 different safety recommendations stemming from the Flight 3407 crash.

"These failures, if left unchanged," the union said, "will continue to be a threat to cause

accidents and incidents in the future."