As America takes stock of counterterrorism policies, it's useful to review two major recommendations in the 9/1 1 Commission Report. The first, which called for creation of a new director of national intelligence to "connect the dots," is finally making some progress in coordinating the 17 agencies of the intelligence community.
But the commission's second big proposal, urging Congress to reform its own intelligence oversight procedures, unfortunately has gone nowhere. It seems members remain addicted to petty politics, even when it comes to reforms demanded in the name of 9/1 1 victims.
Let's look first at the performance of James Clapper, a retired Air Force lieutenant general who is the fourth director of national intelligence (DNI) since the position was established in 2005. The turnover suggests the difficulties defining the job. Too often, it produced layering and turf battles.
Clapper, a goateed, wisecracking 70-year-old veteran of the intelligence community, had run two Pentagon intelligence agencies, and saw the DNI job as coordination, rather than line management. Like his mentor, former Defense Secretary Bob Gates, he's fond of saying, when facing bureaucratic obstacles, "I'm too old for this [expletive]!"
Clapper botched several early media appearances, misstating or appearing unaware of major developments -- not altogether surprising for someone who had spent his career staying out of the limelight. But he got strong reviews from the White House. Recognizing that President Obama was a voracious reader, Clapper revamped the morning intelligence briefing so it wasn't a rehash of the written "President's Daily Brief" and would better meet Obama's needs. White House officials say it was a welcome change.
More important, Clapper began to tackle the real problem the DNI job was supposed to fix -- the sprawling morass of the intelligence community. He started by trimming some of the waste in his own shop. Clapper showed he was willing to kill programs and replace people. He dumped the incumbent deputy director and chief information officer in favor of two stars he brought over from the CIA. He sent one technical function back to the National Security Agency, and transferred an ill-defined National Intelligence University to the Pentagon. He trimmed the roster of deputy directors for national intelligence from four to one, and he cut the staff to 1,600 from about 2,000, with more cuts to come.
The heart of Clapper's integration effort is a new team of national intelligence managers, who drive collection and analysis in 17 subject areas. The model for this sort of fusion is the Joint Special Operations Command -- which can conduct a raid at midnight, say, and analyze and exploit the intelligence quickly enough to conduct another raid at dawn. Clapper wants this kind of agility in the intelligence community as a whole.
The new structure meant the demotion of the analysts who serve as national intelligence officers, and several have quit in protest. But combining supervision of collection and analysis makes sense. More efficiencies are on the way.
Now contrast Clapper's push for integration with the refusal of Congress to do the same thing in oversight of intelligence, as was recommended by the 9/1 1 Commission. Rather than consolidate authorization and appropriation in the House and Senate intelligence committees, as urged, the two remain separate. Worse, the intelligence budget remains hidden in the budgets for the Defense, Treasury, State and other departments. Congress is holding on to the old system to preserve its traditional turf.
"Congressional oversight for intelligence -- and counterterrorism -- is now dysfunctional," wrote the 9/1 1 Commission Report. That was seven years ago, and none of its major recommendations to Congress has been adopted. On the 10th anniversary of the attacks, that's a scandal.