Nation’s first indigenous president challenges entrenched elite, confronts U. S. influence
What counts as democracy in Bolivia?
Evo Morales was elected president of Bolivia late in 2005 and inaugurated in January 2006. He is not only the first indigenous president of Bolivia, but also the first in recent history elected with an outright majority of votes — 54 percent.
But this huge electoral triumph counted in the U. S. government circles as “populist” rather than “democratic.” Asked for the U. S. reaction, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice commented that it would depend on whether he acted democratically. Bolivia and the Bush administration apparently have different definitions of that, and Morales’ presidency — now marked with deep provincial splits, the expulsion of an American ambassador, U. S. retaliations, a touch of street violence and remarkably decisive action that is pulling together a region — poses a hemispheric challenge to the next U. S. president.
On May 1, 2006, Morales nationalized Bolivia’s gas and oil reserves, as he would later nationalize all mineral reserves, with royalties and taxes flowing into the national treasury. The nationalization applied only to underground reserves and not to the “means of production” constructed (for about $3 billion) by international corporations. Although Morales’ move avoided socialism (ownership of the means of production), President Bush and Rice did not consider this a democratic action. Filtered through their small-government ideology, democracy means getting government out of the way of corporate activity, and Morales was doing just the opposite.
From the perspective of the right-wing opposition in Bolivia, as for Bush and Rice, the principal threat to human rights and dignity is not poverty or conditions of slavery, but the “tyranny of centralism” and restrictions on business opportunity. In order to promote right-wing democracy in Bolivia, the Bush administration needed to support and strengthen forces in Bolivia opposed to Morales. This was readily feasible, because of a persistent and deepening struggle in Bolivia between two forces, both of which continue to grow stronger.
One is the indigenous people, dozens of distinct ethnic groups, of which the largest by far are the Quechua and the Aymara; together indigenous people comprise nearly two-thirds of the nation’s population. The revolution of 1952, under Victor Paz Estenssoro, enfranchised these Indians and provided them for the first time with opportunities for education as well as political expression. They think of democracy in Lincoln’s terms — as government of the people, by the people and for the people. The government of Morales is a direct beneficiary of this initiative.
The other is the lighter-skinned elite that includes ranchers, landholders, agro-industrialists and free-trade entrepreneurs. This elite, centered around the booming city of Santa Cruz, also began to prosper 50 years ago because of the policies of Paz Estenssoro. Its strength now extends through the states of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Tarija and Chuquisaca. These five states form a crescent from the north (Pando) through the east to the south (Tarija), and are therefore called the “Half Moon.” Their commercial interests are organized as CONALDE, the nickname of the National Council for Democracy, and they think of democracy in Bush-Rice terms.
In seeking autonomy and local retention of proceeds from the sale of natural gas, they have stood solidly against the government, and so they have naturally been considered by Bush and Rice to be more democratic.
Bush’s point man for pursuing his anti-centralist democracy was Philip S. Goldberg, until 2006 head of the U. S. mission in Kosovo. He presented his credentials to Morales on Oct. 13, 2006, but it seems that he then spent much of his time advising and supporting CONALDE. Goldberg appeared to many to be coach and mentor of the autonomy cabal being cultivated to pierce the Morales regime.
Morales came to the presidency with the aim of implementing four principal changes in the government of Bolivia: nationalizing natural resources, enacting a new constitution, reviving land reform and increasing social services. On the last of these four goals there has been steady progress with little opposition; there have been improvements in health and education and inauguration of an old-age pension. The first of the goals was accomplished before Goldberg arrived, ending a centuries-old practice of looting the nation by exporting both its natural riches and the proceeds from exploiting them. I suspect that many Half Moon leaders thought that Morales (a mere Indian!) would stumble by taking too ambitious a step nationalizing oil and gas, but in any case there was no effective way of opposing a legal declaration.
The other two goals, however, ran into stiff opposition from CONALDE and Goldberg.
The year after the nationalization of mineral resources and of Goldberg’s arrival, 2007, was the year of the “Constituent Assembly” convened in Sucre to draft a new constitution (CPE — Constitucion Politica del Estado). The Half Moon team devised two tactics to derail the process.
The first involved parliamentary quibbles about when a two-thirds majority would be needed, and about the agenda. These diversionary tactics delayed discussion of substantive matters for at least two months. Then rowdies, unrestrained by local authorities, took over streets, preventing delegates from attending the Assembly. In August the frustrated Assembly moved to Oruru, where a final text was ratified.
But delegates from CONALDE refused to go to Oruru, declaring the move illegal and the CPE invalid. So 2007 was a stand-off, and then 2008 started off as the year of referendums. In May, four of the Half Moon states held highly successful referendums calling for autonomy from La Paz. Aug. 10 was the date of the recall referendum that CONALDE had initiated in its attempt to topple Morales. The result was a devastating blow to the opposition: Morales increased his support from 54 percent to 67.4 percent nationally, and increased his support by a comparable percentage in every one of the nine states.
But both sides were fired up. On the one hand the frustrated opposition, led by well-organized youth in Santa Cruz, resorted to increased violence. On the other hand, the peasants, encouraged by the results, increased their marches and demonstrations in support of the government, demanding action.
To many, Morales appeared weak because he declined to use armed force to stop the occupation and ransacking of government offices. He took diplomatic action instead. On Sept. 10, the Bolivian government expelled Goldberg.
“Without fear of the empire, I declare Mr. Goldberg, the U. S. ambassador, ‘persona non grata,’ ” said Morales. “He is conspiring against democracy and seeking the division of Bolivia.”
Washington retaliated by expelling the Bolivian ambassador, withdrawing all Peace Corps workers, declaring Bolivia no longer cooperating in the war on drugs and removing Bolivia from the list of Andean nations enjoying trade preferences. Then Bolivia expelled U. S. Drug Enforcement Agency agents. Tough actions all around, but no blood was shed.
This year’s 9/11 proved even more dramatic and more consequential than 9/10. A thousand peasants were preparing to march into Cobija, capital of the state of Pando, for a rally in support of the CPE. Such a thing had not happened before in Pando, and it was more than Gov. Leopoldo Fernandez, the oldest and most entrenched of the Half Moon governors, could tolerate. Pando’s state militia opened fire with automatic weapons and high-powered rifles, leaving at least 18 dead and more than a dozen others wounded.
The event was immediately labeled a massacre. It was the first large-scale use of armed force since 2003, and the first significant bloodshed in these five years of confrontation. The reaction of Morales was swift and decisive. He immediately declared martial law in Pando, pronounced Fernandez a criminal and sent in the army to secure Cobija and its airport. The city and the airport were secured in a matter of hours. Fernandez was arrested a day or two later and remanded to San Pedro Prison in La Paz, where he remains without bail, charged with genocide.
Morales’ prestige rose dramatically. The following Monday in Santiago, Chile, there was an emergency meeting of the Union of South American Nations. Heads of state came, summoned by Michelle Bachelet, president of Chile and current head of UNASUR, and they unanimously approved a nine-point declaration that condemned the massacre, endorsed Morales and urged CONALDE to enter into dialogue with him. When Morales was elected, the only South American states he visited were Venezuela and Cuba. This time he had the support of all the states of South America, another big boost to his prestige.
Morales had been calling for dialogue on the CPE, but CONALDE had always found excuses for declining. The unanimous declaration of UNASUR changed that. Dialogue began the following week, with working parties reaching consensus on two major conflicts: Gas revenues would first fully fund the new old-age pensions and then be distributed among the state governments, and autonomy would be defined as 30 exclusive jurisdictions for the states and 20 more shared with localities and ethnic communities.
This amounted to enormous progress on what had seemed unresolvable disputes. But two big issues remained, and there were ideologues and pragmatists on both sides.
On Oct. 21 it was clear that pragmatists had the upper hand. A provision about presidential re-election was reworded so that Morales could not be re-elected in 2014, when his new term would expire. To revive land reform, the CPE referendum would be combined with a referendum to limit the maximum size of property holdings, and a further concession agreed that this limitation would not be applied retroactively. Key leaders in CONALDE now supported the double referendum on the CPE and acreage limitation.
Less than a month of dialogue had achieved compromise and agreement on four major issues and a revised CPE with wider support. That brings Morales much closer to three more goals of his presidency: land reform, the CPE and national unity. CONALDE has not disappeared, but the referendum of Aug. 10 was a sharp blow and the aftermath to 9/11 of 2008 has left it divided, partly adamant in opposition and partly cooperative with Morales.
It is a huge achievement. Within Bolivia, Morales has maintained momentum on his main objectives: increasing funds for education, health, and welfare; retaining profits from natural resources; creating a new constitution; reviving land reform; providing limited autonomy; and motivating the old elite to work under these new conditions. Outside Bolivia, he has established closer ties with Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and the strong unanimous support from UNASUR shows how dramatically he has reduced his earlier reliance on Venezuela and Cuba.
It is remarkable that Morales has achieved this through negotiation, reiteration of principles and insistence on prosperity for everyone, without threatening or suppressing opponents. It is a refreshing model of democracy and political leadership, rare among emerging nations but not too different from that of Michelle Bachelet and Lula da Silva. The emergence of these leaders and of UNASUR is a kind of home-grown democracy, a rebuke to Bush-Rice policies and a powerful challenge to our next president.
Log into MyBuffalo to post a comment
MyBuffalo is the new social network from Buffalo.com. Your MyBuffalo account lets you comment on and rate stories at buffalonews.com. You can also head over to mybuffalo.com to share your blog posts, stories, photos, and videos with the community. Join now or learn more.
Reader comments
Learn more about our moderation system.